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I. Introduction 
 
 Sudan is a big country. It covers some 2.5-million square kilometers, or the size 
of Ontario and Québec combined. It is ethnically rich but developmentally poor: in 2001 
it stood 138th in the U.N. Development Program’s Human Development Index, a broad 
measure of attainments in life expectancy, education and real income. 
 
 For all but 12 years since its independence in 1956 Sudan has been marked by a 
low-intensity civil war between the largely Arab and Muslim northern half of the country 
and the largely Black and Christian/animist south. The conflict involves an array of 
ethnic groups and has roots going back several centuries.2 In recent times the conflict has 
had devastating repercussions on the civilian population. The United Nations estimates 
that two million people have died in the fighting since 1983 and at least four million more 
are internally displaced.3 There have been reports of serious human rights violations by 
all sides, including abduction, slavery, forced displacement, starvation and murder. In 
1999 the U.N. Rapporteur on Human Rights in Sudan termed the plight of civilians 
caught in the conflict “one of the most important human rights concerns facing the 
international community.”4 
 
 The civil war entered a new, and particularly vicious, phase in the late 1990s with 
the discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil in the south. The Sudanese 
government granted concessions for exploitation of the fields to foreign oil companies 
and sponsored the construction of a 1540-kilometre pipeline from southern oil fields to 
Port Sudan, a site on the Red Sea, to get the oil to market. The Chinese-built pipeline was 
one of the largest civil works projects in Sudanese history and represented a considerable 
                                               
1 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. The 
author would like to thank Amy Jacob for her assistance in locating tabular information for this 
comment. 
2 For background to the conflict see generally P.M. Holt & W.M. Daly, A History of the Sudan: 
from the coming of Islam to the present day (5th ed.) (2000); P. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: 
the unstable state (1990). 
3 U.N. Economic and Social Council, The Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, 
E/CN.4/1999/38/Add.1, para. 42 (1999). 
4 Ibid., para. 159. 
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achievement when oil began flowing in 1999. Sudan, which previously had to spend 
foreign exchange on its oil import bill, suddenly attained a degree of energy self-
sufficiency and started to make money from oil exports. In the period 1998-2000 inflows 
of oil money went from being negligible to contributing 28.4% of government revenue.5 
The money represented an opportunity to increase development spending, but at least 
some of it has gone towards military purchases.6 This has given a new edge to 
government forces. In January 2001 the U.N. Rapporteur indicated that “[o]il exploitation 
has resulted in the exacerbation of the war.”7 
 
 The Khartoum government’s principal opponent in the war is the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA), which sees oil exploitation as enhancing the government’s 
ability to fight.8 In 1994 the government and southern opposition groups concluded a 
Declaration of Principles, the cornerstone of which was official recognition of the right 
of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. In 1995, however, the 
government chose to pursue a strategy of “peace from within” and in April 1997 signed 
the Khartoum Peace Agreement with six splinter rebel groups in which it emphasized that 
the general principles of the Declaration would guide future talks. Nevertheless, the 
SPLA refused to sign the Agreement because the government declared that it did not 
consider the Declaration to be binding, but merely a basis for future discussions. As a 
result hostilities continue.   
 
 Plans for an oil pipeline from the south were first made by Chevron, an American 
oil company, which began exploration in 1975. In 1984 the company halted its Sudan 
operation in response to the abduction and killing of three expatriate Chevron workers by 
the SPLA. Chevron eventually pulled out of Sudan altogether and sold its Sudanese 
assets to a small Canadian oil company which was acquired by Talisman Energy Inc. of 
Calgary in October 1998. As part of the purchase Talisman took over a 49,200-sq. km. 
concession 700 kilometres south of Khartoum. Talisman decided to operate the 
concession with the help of Chinese, Malaysian and Sudanese partners through a 
Mauritius-registered joint venture, Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company 
(GNPOC), in which it retains a 25 percent interest.9 In 2000 Talisman provided the 
                                               
5 International Monetary Fund, Sudan: Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV Consultation and 
Fourth Review of the First Annual Program Under the Medium-Term Staff-Monitored Program, 
IMF Country Report No. 00/70 (June 2000) at p. 21. 
6 IMF staff observe that military expenditures increased by 35% in the 2000 program compared 
with 1999 and have “encouraged the authorities to keep it below budgeted levels” but note that 
“pressures for increased expenditures in this area are not likely to abate in the near future.” Ibid., 
at p. 24, 35. 
7 U.N. Economic and Social Council, The Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan: Note by the 
Secretariat, E/CN.4/2001/48, para. 21 (Jan. 25, 2001).  
8 Amnesty International, Sudan: the Human Price of Oil, AFR 54/01/2000, p. 2 (May 2000). 
9 Other partners in the GNPOC consortium are a wholly owned subsidiary of the China National 
Petroleum  Corporation (40%), a wholly owned subsidiary of the national oil company of 
Malaysia, Petronas (30%), and the national petroleum company of Sudan, Sudapet (5%). Key 
management positions are occupied by representatives of each members of the consortium. 
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government of Sudan with $306-million worth in royalties from its share in GNPOC and 
reported a $126-million profit on Sudan operations.10 
 
Fig. 1 
GNPOC Concession and Route of Oil Pipeline in Sudan 
 
 
The GNPOC concession sits in the heart of disputed territory. Southern rebel 
groups have threatened that those working with the consortium will be regarded as, in 
effect, "northern" accomplices.11 Talisman therefore requested the Sudanese government 
to ensure law and order in the concession.12 To meet this request the government has 
                                                                                                                                            
Decisions made by committees within GNPOC require an affirmative vote of two members of the 
board representing at least 60% interest.  
10 See Talisman Energy Social Responsibility Report 2000, p. 28 and Talisman Energy Annual 
Report 2000, p. 59. 
11 In its Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 Talisman notes that “periodic threats are 
made by rebel forces and clearly indicate that both [GNPOC] personnel and property are 
considered legitimate targets in the war against the Government of Sudan.” See p. 14. 
12 Amnesty International, Sudan: the Human Price of Oil, AFR 54/01/2000, p. 8 (May 2000). 
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employed the military and government-armed militias. There is, however, considerable 
evidence that the government has been using concession facilities to launch offensive 
operations within the concession and further south.13 
 
 Talisman's investment in Sudan therefore raises profound concern about corporate 
operations in countries where there are serious and frequent human rights violations. The 
company's presence has been interpreted by many as providing essential support to a 
repressive regime and as condoning the government's policies towards the south. This 
leads to the question what, if any, are Talisman's obligations at this particular juncture, 
one of fertile development in the field of international corporate social responsibility? 
This comment examines this question in light of recent events. 
 
II. Talisman Energy and the Harker Report 
 
 Talisman has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism from church groups and 
other NGOs since the outset of its involvement in Sudan. These groups allege that 
GNPOC operations are aiding and abetting aggression against the civilian population. 
The principal criticisms made against Talisman can be grouped in three categories. The 
first concerns discriminatory hiring and forcible displacement of population in the 
concession area and along the pipeline route. The second involves the utilization of 
GNPOC-built facilities by Sudanese government forces for offensive military purposes. 
The third centers around the use of GNPOC-generated oil revenue by the Sudanese 
government for prosecution of the war. 
 
 In October 1999 growing criticism led the Canadian government to announce that 
it would send an envoy, former ILO representative John Harker, to Sudan to conduct an 
assessment mission of Talisman's operations. The inquiry was premised on the idea that 
there was a link between oil exploitation and human rights abuses, particularly slavery 
and slave-like practices, and that Canada was, in some sense, internationally responsible 
for the acts of its corporate "citizen", Talisman Energy. Harker's report concluded that 
GNPOC installations had been used to commit human rights violations, “that Sudan is a 
place of extraordinary suffering … and [that] the oil operations in which a Canadian 
company is involved add more suffering.”14 
 
The Canadian government did not respond in any legal way to Harker’s 
                                               
13 In its Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 Talisman notes that “Despite the 
Company’s stated position regarding the use of the Heglig airstrip and advocacy efforts in this 
regard, we believe that there were at least four instances of non-defensive usage of the Heglig 
airstrip in 2000. On these occasions helicopters or planes landed on the airstrip for reasons that 
we could not determine were related to oilfield security and their presence was considered non-
defensive by Talisman.” (p. 16). See also J. Sallot, “Ottawa covering up for Talisman in Sudan, 
MP says”, The Globe and Mail A5 (May 5, 2001). 
14 J. Harker, Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission (January 
2000) at p. 15. 
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conclusions.15 Instead, it requested Talisman to abide by the International Code of Ethics 
for Canadian Business, a voluntary code of corporate conduct designed to be monitored 
by neutral third parties.16 The Canadian government also instituted a policy of 
engagement with the Sudanese regime, opening a consular office in Khartoum and 
holding talks with Sudanese officials on the human rights situation in the country. 
 
 Talisman adopted the Code in December 1999. Despite this action the company 
continues to be dodged by criticism and threats of shareholder divestment. In February 
2000 the United States announced sanctions against GNPOC and in May 2000 a group of 
shareholders asked Talisman's Board of Directors to prepare an independently verified 
report on the company's compliance with the Code within 180 days. Talisman 
subsequently released its first Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report under the 
Code in April 2001.17 
 
III. Corporate Social Responsibility in Domestic and International Law 
 
 A corporation is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders with separate liability 
and the capacity of continuous succession.18 Although it is not unknown in international 
law, the corporation is principally a creation of domestic law and generally organized 
according to the laws of one jurisdiction.19 The typical corporation’s business and affairs 
are managed by the board of directors who owe a duty to the corporation’s collective 
ownership, the shareholders. Traditionally this duty was thought of as being to protect the 
corporation’s capital and produce profits. 
 
 In the 20th century duties owed by directors in law began to expand to employees, 
consumers and the general public. Recent literature on corporate governance refers to the 
“stakeholder” concept of the corporation, or the idea that the conduct of the corporation’s 
                                               
15 The Harker Report suggested that the Canadian government adopt a step-by-step approach to 
the situation, with a public statement expressing grave concern by the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
followed by an announcement that certain exports to Sudan would be subjected to scrutiny under 
the Export and Import Controls Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. E-19,  followed, if necessary, by placement 
of Sudan on the Area Control List. Harker also identified application of the Special Economic 
Measures Act, S.C. 1992, c. 17 as a possibility.  
16 The text of the Code is available at www.uottawa.ca/hrrec/busethics/codeint.html. For 
background see S. Chase, “Talisman Bows to Ottawa, adopts business code of ethics” The Globe 
and Mail, A1 (Dec. 11, 1999).  
17 Talisman Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, available at www.talisman-energy.com. 
18 The Dictionary of Canadian Law (2nd ed.) 260 (1995). For discussion in the international 
context see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3. 
19 Brownlie refers to the situation of intergovernmental corporations of private law whereby 
“states may by treaty create legal persons the status of which is regulated by the national law of 
one or more of the parties” and gives the example Eurofima, a company set up by 14 European 
countries under Swiss law in 1955 to jointly manage railway rolling stock. Even in this instance, 
however, there was reference to a governing system of domestic law. See I. Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International Law (5th ed.) 67 (1998).  
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business affects not only shareholders but other sectors of the public as well. There is the 
increasingly current view that these other interests should be accounted in some way. 
 
 Apart from specific statutory obligations, however, courts in Canada and 
elsewhere have in general been reluctant to accept the idea that corporate directors owe a 
duty to the general public or to any particular sector thereof.20 Instead, changes taking 
place in corporate governance are being self- or statutorily imposed. For instance, many 
mutual funds already keep a close watch on how firms deal with a variety of 
controversies. This growing interest is also reflected in amendments to legislation in 
countries like Britain, where new rules require pension funds to disclose how they deal 
with outside issues.21       
 
 International law does not yet have much to say formally about corporate social 
responsibility. The language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights22, which 
speaks of “every individual and every organ of society” as having a duty to strive for the 
promotion of human rights, is sometimes referred to as evidence that corporations, as 
legal persons, have such a duty. Certain instruments, such as the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy23, the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises24 and the U.N. Draft International Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations25, could be considered a framework for 
international corporate behavior, but none has been consistently endorsed in terms of 
adherence or practice by a clear majority of the international community. There remains, 
in addition, the question of how to regulate private entities in a system of public law. 
Moreover most instruments have been drafted by existing states and, in deference to 
sensitivities of sovereignty, focus more on individual human rights than on group rights 
to self-determination now at the heart of the conflict in Sudan. For instance the Tripartite 
Declaration provides that: 
                                               
20 “The firmly established rule at common law was that directors owe a fiduciary obligation to the 
corporation, but not to individual shareholders. The current view would appear to be that, while 
special circumstances may give rise to a fiduciary relationship between a director and 
shareholders, no general fiduciary obligation exists.” McCarthy Tétrault, Directors and Officers 
Duties and Liabilities in Canada 42-43 (1997); see Bell v. Source Data Control Ltd., (1988) 66 
O.R. (2d) 78 (C.A.); Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 737 (H.C.), 
aff’d (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.). In England see Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum, 
[1974] A.C. 821 (P.C.); in the United States see Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
21 In July 2000 the British government introduced a Socially Responsible Investment regulation 
under s. 35 of the Pensions Act 1995 which requires pension funds to disclose the extent to which 
they consider social, environmental or other ethical criteria in investment decisions, and policies 
directing the exercise of rights (e.g. voting) attached to their investments. 
22 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
23 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978). 
24 15 I.L.M. 969 (1976). 
25 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984). 
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All parties concerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign rights of 
States, obey the national laws and regulations, give due consideration to local 
practices and respect relevant international standards. They should respect the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the corresponding International 
Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the 
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and its principles …. They 
should also honour commitments which they have freely entered into, in 
conformity with the national law and accepted international obligations.26 
 
These human rights are important, but they alone are not a useful measure of Talisman’s 
activities in the current context. Some accounting of Talisman’s activities in relation to 
group rights is necessary. 
 
 Recently, the position of international law regarding corporate social 
responsibility has begun to change. This is happening for two reasons. First, there has 
been tremendous development of soft law codes of conduct, a development prompted in 
part by the lack of anything similar at an official level. Initiatives such as the Amnesty 
International Guidelines for Companies27, Social Accountability 800028, the U.N. Global 
Compact29, the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility Benchmarks for 
Measuring Business Performance30 and the Global Sullivan Principles31 have 
proliferated. These seem to appeal to the free-market tenor of the times in being non-
governmental and self-regulating. 
 
                                               
26 17 I.L.M. 422 at 424 (1978). 
27 Available at www.amnesty.org.uk/business/pubs. 
28 Social Accountability 8000 is a standards association established in 1997 to verify international 
labour conditions in a transparent manner and is modeled on the international standards 
organization ISO 9000 standard used by companies for quality control purposes. See 
www.cepaa.org/introduction.htm. 
29 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan first proposed the Global Compact in an address to the 
World Economic Forum in January 1999. He challenged world business leaders to help build the 
social and environmental pillars required to sustain the new global economy. The Compact 
encompasses nine principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the                  
ILO's Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work and the Rio Principles on Environment and 
Development. The Compact promotes good practices by corporations. It does not endorse 
companies. See www.unglobalcompact.org. 
30 The Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR) is an ecumenical 
coalition of major churches in Canada. It assists member organizations in promoting and             
implementing policies adopted by them on the social and environmental responsibility of              
Canadian-based corporations and financial institutions: www.web.net/~tccr/ 
31 The Global Sullivan Principles (GSP) derive from the original Sullivan Principles, a code of 
conduct for companies operating in South Africa devised by a Philadelphia cleric, the Rev. Leon 
Sullivan, in 1977. In 1997 they were updated and renamed the GSP. See 
globalsullivanprinciples.org 
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 Second, the foregoing private initiatives, together with renewed concern about 
international corporate power and business ethics, are promoting something of a 
renaissance in multilateral efforts to define corporate social responsibility. Thus, new 
voluntary instruments have either been adopted or are under consideration by the U.N.32, 
OECD33 and EU34. 
 
 One multilateral initiative meriting particular attention is the United Nations Draft 
Human Rights Guidelines for Companies35. The Draft Human Rights Guidelines were 
begun in 1999 in response to concern about the unwieldly proliferation of soft law. 
Simply put, the fear was that the multiplicity of mechanisms was allowing companies to 
pick and choose or to claim that the range of choices inhibited them from acting. The 
Guidelines thus seek to comprehensively interpret the Universal Declaration in a form 
which can be implemented by private entities. The Guidelines are more precise and 
nuanced than the Universal Declaration, and therefore better at covering the variety of 
circumstances in which human rights need protection. For example Draft Art. 16 states 
that: 
 
Companies shall have the responsibility to ensure that their business operations 
do not contribute directly or indirectly to human rights abuses and actively to 
speak out or otherwise use their influence in order to help promote and ensure 
respect for human rights. 
 
The reference here regarding indirect corporate contribution to human rights abuses is 
particularly noteworthy. Likewise, Draft Art. 18 states that: 
 
Companies shall respect the rights of indigenous communities and minorities to 
own, develop, control, protect, and use their lands and cultural and intellectual 
property; indigenous communities and minorities may not be deprived of their 
own means of subsistence. 
 
This last provision presents something of an advance over the statist position of previous 
documents. Properly implemented, it could sanction the kind of activity Talisman now 
finds itself undertaking in southern Sudan. However the Draft Guidelines remain both a 
                                               
32 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights is currently working on a set of Draft Universal Human Rights Guidelines for 
Companies. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/WG.2/WP.1/Add.1 (2001). 
33 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 40 I.L.M. 237 (2001). The Guidelines are 
recommendations made by OECD member governments to multinational enterprises and address 
a range of corporate activity that have become of pressing concerning since the last set of general 
OECD Guidelines issued in 1976. 
34 In January 1999 the European Parliament adopted a set of proposals on the accountability of 
European-based multinationals. The proposals, derived from a report entitled Towards a 
European Code of Conduct, aim to establish a “European Monitoring Platform” concerning 
multinational accountability on a broad range of social issues. 
35 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.1/Add.1 (May 25, 2000). 
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“draft” and “guidelines”, with all the limited normative significance that those terms 
entail. The long-term hope is that they will one day become a binding framework for 
companies, but at present they are not. 
 
 In the meantime it is possible to conclude that Talisman, in continuing to operate 
in Sudan with clear evidence that oil revenues are financing the civil war, is indirectly 
contributing to serious human rights abuses. In this respect it is in breach of the Draft 
Guidelines and, by extension, the Universal Declaration. A second conclusion is that 
Talisman is operating in the south with permission of the government. Given the state of 
civil war in the country, however, that permission cannot be said to reflect the will of 
southerners. As a minority they are entitled to a degree of control over resources 
emanating from their lands. This is confirmed by a number of new instruments.36 It is 
also rapidly becoming a norm of state practice. Talisman is therefore in breach of the 
Draft Guidelines and of an emerging norm of international law in appropriating resources 
without consent.   
 
IV. The International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business 
 
 A Canadian attempt to deal with issues of corporate social responsibility occurred 
in 1997 when a roundtable of corporate, NGO and academic representatives created an 
International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business. This followed a public outcry over 
Canadian corporate activity in the Nigerian petroleum industry under the Abacha 
dictatorship. The Code is a collection of beliefs, values and principles guided by an 
overall vision of Canadian business abroad as both profitable and socially responsible. 
The Code was adopted by 13 companies at the time of its creation. The most recent 
information available indicates that only two Canadian companies, including Talisman, 
have signed on since. The Code is voluntary and non-binding and in this sense does not 
add much to the instruments already reviewed, but because Talisman’s efforts in 
corporate responsibility are measured according it, the Code should be examined.  
 
 The Code reflects five generations of corporate conduct, with the first (conflict of 
interest) bearing primarily on corporate interest while the remaining four (commercial 
conduct, employee and other third party concerns, community and environmental 
concerns, and accountability and social justice) refer to external interests and values. The 
Code expresses the belief that “businesses should take a leadership role through 
establishment of ethical business principles”, and that while “confrontation should be 
tempered by diplomacy” and “national governments have the prerogative to conduct their 
own government and legal affairs in accordance with their sovereign rights”, “all 
governments should comply with international treaties and other agreements that they 
have committed to”. The Code also enshrines principles that companies will “support and 
promote the protection of international human rights within our sphere of influence” and 
“not be complicit in human rights abuses”. Similarly they will “comply with all 
                                               
36 See Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO 
Convention No. 169, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989); Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 
(1992); Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights, 34 I.L.M. 541 (1995). 
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applicable laws” and will “strive for social justice and promote freedom of expression in 
the workplace.” 
   
 The Code is to be implemented in individual firms through the development of 
operational codes and practices. There is no guide as to how this translation is to be 
effected, except that the result must be “consistent” with the Code’s provisions. 
Verification is to be effected by outside parties hired by signatories to the Code for that 
purpose. 
 
V. Talisman Energy’s Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000 
 
 Talisman’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report 2000 was released in 
April 2001 in an effort to comply with the Code. The 42-page Report was verified by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), a worldwide consulting firm, and provides a snapshot of 
Talisman and its operations in Sudan. Unlike audited accounting reports, the Report is 
self-admittedly not “a broad overall assessment of our presence in Sudan. Rather, it 
describes how we have interpreted the Code through the Principles which we have 
adopted.”37 Talisman notes that there are no generally accepted standards against which 
its activities can be measured. Consequently, it plans to spend the period 2001-2003 
developing performance indicators. With these, presumably, Talisman will be in a better 
position to be assessed. The CSR Report observes “we intend to expand the reporting 
process in future years.”38  
 
 The prototypical nature of the CSR Report is underlined in PwC’s Verification 
Statement, which observes that “There are currently no statutory requirements or 
generally accepted international standards for the preparation, public reporting and 
attestation or corporate social responsibility reports.” For this reason PwC’s verification 
approach “reflects emerging best practice and is in accordance with the International 
Standard on Assurance Engagements.”39 The Verification Statement also notes 
significant limitations on PwC’s work. Certain visits had to be cleared with GNPOC or 
national security, who have a record of antipathy towards southerners and who might 
make access to southern representatives difficult. Likewise the Statement indicates that 
PwC auditors “did not visit any sites in the south of Sudan outside the concession area 
but we did speak to Southern Sudanese in Khartoum and to international non-
governmental organisations in Nairobi.”40 Thus it is not entirely clear how or where 
inside Sudan PwC consulted with independent southern sources. 
 
 The CSR Report goes on to define corporate social responsibility as “conducting 
activities in an economically, socially and environmentally responsible manner.”41 
                                               
37 CSR Report, p. 9. 
38 CSR Report, p. 41. 
39 CSR Report, p. 11. 
40 CSR Report, p. 11. 
41 CSR Report, p. 4. 
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Responsibility is, in turn, conceived of according to the International Code of Ethics for 
Canadian Business, a translation of the Code for GNPOC purposes (the Sudan Operating 
Principles), and key stakeholder concerns. From these are derived concrete aims in the 
form of Talisman objectives (“those which are under our direct control and 
responsibility”), GNPOC objectives (“those objectives whose achievement depends on 
the agreement or support of our GNPOC business partners”) and advocacy objectives 
(“those over which we have minimal control but for which we believe we have a 
responsibility to advocate within governments or international organizations”). 
 
 The CSR Report is divided into several sections. Objectives are considered in 
chapters on human rights, community participation, employee rights, ethical business 
conduct, health safety and the environment, and stakeholder engagement. Thus, for 
instance, the International Code’s principle of support for human rights is translated into 
a commitment to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the Sudan 
Operating Principles, followed by an accounting for key stakeholder concerns, and 
several specific objectives. An overview of this translation is provided in Fig. 2. 
 12 
 
 The translation of principles and concerns into objectives is generally worthwhile. 
Where problems arise, they are often with the appropriateness of objectives in context. 
For instance, Talisman has translated the Code principle that it will “support and promote 
the protection of international human rights within our sphere of influence” into “we are 
committed to upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” This formulation is 
questionable inasmuch as the Declaration itself is generally regarded as aspirational and 
has been refined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of which Sudan 
Support and promote the 
protection of international 
human rights within sphere 
of influence. 
Commitment to upholding 
the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 
Security forces activities. Promote to GNPOC 
partners the formalization 
of the provision of security 
that complies with the 
pertinent UN Codes of 
Conduct. 
Promote to the 
Government of Sudan the 
formalization of the 
provision of security that 
complies with the pertinent 
UN Codes of Conduct. Not to be complicit in 
human rights abuses. 
Commitment to addressing 
human rights concerns 
arising from our own and 
GNPOC operations. 
Use corporate influence to 
ensure that the GNPOC 
infrastructure is not used 
for offensive military 
purposes. 
Work with GNPOC 
partners to provide training 
to GNPOC security 
personnel on human rights 
and international standards 
for use of security and 
forces. 
Use of oilfield 
infrastructure 
Promote to GNPOC 
partners the development 
of guidelines on the 
acceptable uses of oilfield 
infrastructure and promote 
the implementation of this 
program to our GNPOC 
partners. 
Encourage GNPOC 
partners to adopt a code of 
ethics that addresses the 
protection of human rights. 
Develop a human rights 
training and awareness 
program for all managers 
and employees working in 
Sudan. 
Human Rights 
Promote the principle that 
people adversely impacted 
by GNPOC operations 
receive fair and just 
compensation. 
Promote a program of 
independent monitoring of 
humanrights to GNPOC 
partners. 
Develop and implement a 
program to monitor and 
investigate human rights 
concerns arising from our 
own and GNPOC 
operations 
Develop a framework for a 
program of independent 
monitoring of human rights 
concerns arising from 
Talisman and GNPOC 
operations. 
Promote a program of 
independent monitoring of 
human rights to the 
Government of Sudan 
Meet with officials from the 
Government of Sudan to 
advocate support for the 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Promote to the 
Government of Sudan the 
development of guidelines 
on the acceptable uses of 
oilfield infrastructure. 
Fig. 2 
Talisman’s Formulation of Corporate Responsibility Objectives in the Field of Human Rights 
 
Key Stakeholder 
Concerns 
Talisman 
Objectives 
GNPOC  
Objectives 
General Advocacy 
Objectives 
Sudan Operating 
Principles 
The International 
Code of Ethics for 
Canadian Business 
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has ratified.42 These later instruments, together with such documents as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination43, the ILO 
Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)44, the 1994 Declaration of 
Principles and the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement – which have been approved by the 
Sudanese government - would constitute a more specific and effective basis for 
Talisman’s advocacy. Talisman counters that it can only be expected to advocate within 
its “sphere of influence”, but this sphere should be broadly conceived by the company 
given its major role in the Sudanese economy and its record of influence with the 
Khartoum government. There is, moreover, no requirement that Talisman limit itself to 
lobbying on the basis of documents that apply to it. In this connection the company 
should recall the Code principle that “all governments should comply with international 
treaties and other agreements that they have committed to”. 
 
 A second concern with objectives as detailed in the CSR Report is the failure of 
Talisman to account for, and seek the return of, civilians forcibly displaced from their 
homes in the concession area and along the pipeline route. The relevant international 
standard in this respect, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, mandates 
that “[d]isplacement shall last no longer than required by the circumstances”.45 The CSR 
Report takes a more restricted view of the appropriate GNPOC objective: it is to 
“promote the principle that people adversely impacted by GNPOC operations receive fair 
and just compensation”. The Report details that during the planning and construction of 
the pipeline the government formed a Pipeline Compensation Committee and “through 
this process thousands of compensation cases have been paid”. However, Talisman 
admits that “the process of identifying people affected by such activity and the provision 
of fair compensation has not been well documented.”46 It would seem that what is 
necessary is for Talisman to press GNPOC to conduct some accounting of the massive 
human displacement related to oil exploration, as detailed in the Harker Report and 
elsewhere, and to seek the return of people so displaced. Instead, the CSR Report speaks 
merely in terms of compensation, and in that respect, in sums that could not possibly 
reasonably compensate for the dislocation and hardship that have taken place. 
 
 The dissonance between Talisman and independent sources is repeated elsewhere. 
The CSR Report notes, for instance, that Talisman has developed “a detailed human 
rights monitoring and investigation program manual to address concerns arising from 
GNPOC operations” but the small number of complaints through it does not match third-
party reports of atrocities or abuse, suggesting some other explanation for the company’s 
results. Talisman notes, for instance: 
 
                                               
42 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976). 
43 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966). 
44 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (1958). 
45 Contained as an annex to the Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. 
Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 1998). See Principle 6(3). 
46 CSR Report, p. 17. 
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Our records show that a further 10 cases were opened in November 2000 to keep 
files of initial interviews with people who have been displaced. These cases 
include six individuals who have come to Paryang during 2000 from surrounding 
villages to escape from famine, disease or conflict; and two people who left 
Paryang, seven and 20 years ago respectively, and have now returned.47  
 
Contrast this with the testimony of a refugee – far from unique - about conditions in 
Paryang given to the Harker mission the year before and included in its Report: 
 
About 200 people came to Biem from Paryang. I came from Paryang in May. My 
family was repatriated to Paryang from Khartoum by the Government of Sudan 
and the Government would not let us leave Paryang town. The Government of 
Sudan forces mistreated us. We were not given any services, we had to find our 
own food and make our own living. When the women would go to gather wood 
and cut grass to build shelters, the Arab militia followed is to take what we had 
and rape us. I tried to escape with three others from the town. The Government of 
Sudan [forces] shot at us. The others were killed. I was hit in the leg but managed 
to escape.48  
 
A similar discrepancy exists in Talisman’s version of military use of the Talisman-built 
Heglig airstrip, which the company describes in terms of there having been “at least four 
instances of non-defensive usage of the Heglig airstrip in 2000.” The Harker Report, on 
the other hand, noted: 
 
We also learned, and have reported, that flights clearly linked to the oil war have 
been a regular feature of life at the Heglig airstrip, which is adjacent to the oil 
workers’ compound. It is operated by the consortium, and Canadian chartered 
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft which use the strip have shared the facilities 
with helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers of the Government of Sudan. 
These have armed and re-fuelled at Heglig and from there attacked civilians.49 
 
Given details in the Harker Report and incidents raised by the U.N. Rapporteur and 
NGOs, one could have reasonably expected Talisman’s auditors would make some effort 
to deal with them, yet there is nothing of the sort. For example, the murder of eight Nuer 
tribesmen who had gone seeking jobs with GNPOC in August 1999 and were put to death 
for it, according to the Harker Report, is nowhere addressed.50 In general there is an 
empty, dream-like quality to the CSR Report’s descriptions and numbers which vary so 
considerably from reliable outside reports that they must be taken to greatly understate 
the magnitude of the situation. Simply put, the effort made by Talisman does not square 
                                               
47 CSR Report, p. 18. 
48 Harker Report, p. 84. 
49 Harker Report, p. 15. 
50 On this particular incident John Harker went so far as to express his hope in the Report that the 
Government of Canada “will call for an investigation of [this] serious allegation”  and added that 
“[w]e hope Talisman will join us in calling for, and facilitating, the investigation we seek.” Ibid., 
p. 14. 
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with its obligation under the Code and in an emerging field of international law to “take a 
leadership role” in investigating and correcting human rights abuses caused by its 
activities.   
 
 Perhaps the most profound weakness of the CSR Report is its failure to address 
explicitly the question of the company’s continuing presence in Sudan. This is an issue 
that looms large over Talisman’s operation and before any reader of the Report. 
However, it receives almost no attention. Instead, the company sidesteps the question, 
adopting a sort of earnest “gee shucks - we’re learning” tone and justifying its operation 
in the narrowest and most formal of terms, as the following passage demonstrates: 
 
There is a legitimate debate regarding the role of development in areas of civil 
unrest. We believe that our involvement in Sudan is a positive one and that our 
actions are in compliance with the International Code of Ethics for Canadian 
Business. We also believe that we can help the people of Sudan by providing 
employment and skills training, enhancing local infrastructure, supporting further 
economic development, and by doing what we can to support peace and stability 
in the region. We recognize that others have differing opinions.51 
 
Talisman’s implicit position appears to be that “it’s better for us to be doing this than 
someone else who might not be as committed to human rights as we are.” The point is, 
however, that misery remains, and pumping oil by anyone exacerbates it. One might, of 
course, ask the question posed by a Sudanese academic and headlined in the Report: “If 
Talisman were to leave, would the oil stop flowing?”, but this undermines the principle of 
the universality of human rights and has to be dismissed. Human rights are rights as well 
as obligations and are Talisman’s to uphold regardless of what others do in its place. At 
the very least the company could have expressed a more considered rationale for its 
presence in Sudan. Without one, Talisman’s commitment to corporate social 
responsibility in this context appears questionable. 
 
 There are some positive developments outlined in the CSR Report. Talisman 
indicates that it will use its influence to ensure GNPOC job candidates are treated equally 
and not discriminated against, a problem identified in the Harker Report.52 More 
generally the company is trying to instill a community of respect for human rights among 
its employees by sending Talisman employees to courses at the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre in Clementsport, Nova Scotia. Assistance of a material nature is also being 
provided through Talisman philanthropy. The CSR Report refers to Talisman-supplied 
medical services, waterworks, education and emergency relief worth $1 million given in 
2000. More money will be given in future. The CSR Report includes a profile of 
                                               
51 CSR Report, p. 42. 
52 “Certainly, there seem to be few, if any, Nuer or Dinka at work at Heglig, which seems to fit a 
widely held view in Western Upper Nile that the [Government of Sudan], thus GNPOC, views all 
non-Arabs as potential threats to security. … If Talisman was serious about being a good 
corporate citizen, it would win the support of its GNPOC partners to have an audit of hiring and 
employment practices carried out by the International Labour Organization.” Harker Report, p. 
14 (emphasis in original). 
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GNPOC’s national employee complex in Khartoum, although systemic bias in GNPOC 
hiring means few southerners are likely to benefit from it. It also highlights Talisman’s 
assistance to a vocational school, again in Khartoum, which provides trades training to 
1,000 boys. The CSR Report does not say, however, what Talisman is doing to improve 
vocational prospects for Sudanese women. 
 
 Talisman’s efforts are noteworthy. At the same time, however, they must be 
understood in the context of what GNPOC is doing. Oil development is the indirect cause 
of serious human rights abuses in Sudan. Talisman and its partners appear to be trying to 
do something about them, but they have completely neglected the group rights that are at 
the root of these acts and an honest examination of their own contribution to the conflict. 
Many critical questions have been raised by others and could have been addressed here. 
In most respects they were not. Consequently, the CSR Report comes across as 
superficial and falls well short of evoking the robust spirit in which the Code was 
conceived. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Talisman Energy’s CSR Report in southern Sudan presents a mixed, but 
ultimately disappointing, picture. On the one hand the company has committed itself to a 
leadership role in corporate social responsibility and has done some things to alleviate 
some individual human rights abuses. On the other hand, the company’s actions to date 
appear insufficient. It has failed to adequately examine the most profound question, 
which is whether it should pull-out. There can be nothing but a sense of dissatisfaction at 
Talisman’s failure to assess its Sudan operation critically. 
 
 What can be done? The situation here is complicated by the form in which 
Talisman operates in Sudan. GNPOC is Mauritius-registered and Khartoum-based. It has 
a part owner which is Canadian. Could Canada be held responsible for Talisman/GNPOC 
acts? International law does not provide a general rule on the attribution of responsibility 
for corporate activity. Some reference to broad principle is necessary. 
 
 The general rule of international law is to authorize the national state of a 
company to exercise a right of diplomatic protection on its behalf. At the same time 
several regimes and authorities of international law require a genuine link or connection 
between a company and a protecting state based on the nature and quality of the contacts 
in question.53 If a right of diplomatic protection is enjoyed, there is presumptively no 
reason why a duty of diplomatic responsibility should not arise. It makes sense that this 
duty should be proportional to the foreseeability and degree of corporate involvement, to 
the capacity to act, and to the nature and gravity of the wrong. 
 
 In this instance it is clear that Mauritius has no real connection with the situation 
                                               
53 C.F. Amerasinghe, “Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States” (1974-75) 47 Br. Y.B. Int’l L. 
227 at 267. 
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and that the national governments of Talisman’s major co-partners, China and Malaysia, 
will not pursue the matter. Canada is left to deal with the abuses, which are serious and 
not entirely unforeseen.54 The government has asked Talisman to adhere to the Code and 
has undertaken a process of dialogue with the Sudanese government. In light of the 
Code’s modest impact on Talisman’s corporate conduct, however, what else can be done? 
The Harker Report referred to several options, including putting certain Sudanese goods 
on the Import Control List, putting Sudan itself on the Area Control List, or, in the case 
of multilateral sanctions against Sudan, invoking the Special Economic Measures Act. 
The difficulty with all of these options is that Canada-Sudan trade is negligible and that 
there is no enthusiasm for multilateral sanctions against Sudan.55 This leaves the 
government’s current strategy of constructive engagement as the only practical prospect. 
 
 Another consideration is the United States. Sudan may be distant, but it has not 
gone unnoticed in Washington. The fact that Canadian and other foreign oil companies 
are profiting from their Sudanese ventures has increased American oil companies’ 
interest in joining them. At present they are forbidden by U.S. sanctions from 
participating in operations in Sudan, but recent American diplomacy has indicated a 
desire to find a solution to the conflict.56 There are signs that Sudanese political figures 
have been receptive to this pressure.57 
 
 Could Canadian corporate behaviour be a catalyst for change abroad? That is 
clearly Talisman and the government’s hope. Those who observe events in Sudan with 
history in mind will recall the “intermediate” period of Canadian corporate participation 
in South Africa in the 1970s after the Canadian government’s prohibition on new 
investment but before the push for divestment. At that time like arguments were made 
about continuing the corporate presence of enlightened foreign employers under 
                                               
54 “Canada has in the past expressed grave reservations concerning private sector involvement 
that may heighten tensions or otherwise fuel ongoing conflicts. Canada has consistently 
discouraged companies from doing business in Sudan and in 1992 suspended all support, 
including export finance and trade development programs. It has also issued warnings regarding 
therisks of working in the Sudanese oilfields due to security concerns and the potential danger to 
employees.” Harker Report, p. 25. 
55 Article 4 of SEMA provides that the government may only invoke the Act “for the purpose of                                 
implementing a decision, resolution or recommendation of an international organization of states 
or association of states, of which Canada is a member, that calls on its                                
members to take economic measures against a foreign state.” Alternatively, measures may be 
taken where the government “is of the opinion that a grave breach of international peace and 
security has occurred that has resulted or is likely to result in a serious                               
international crisis.” The phrase “grave breach of international peace and security” is generally 
taken to mean Security Council action under Ch. VII of the U.N. Charter. 
56 M. Lacey, “Sudan War in Agenda for Powell in Africa Visit” The New York Times (May 23, 
2001);  J. Perlez, “Suddenly in Sudan, a Moment to Care” The New York Times (June 17, 2001). 
57 J. Harker, “A Small Start on Peace” The Globe & Mail (June 1, 2001) (referring to the 
commencement of negotiations between the Khartoum government and southern forces in 
Nairobi). 
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apartheid. 
 
 It is hard, however, to make any such analogy here. The prevailing political 
constellation, the specificity of the actors involved, the rights at issue and the magnitude 
of abuse all call for a serious re-evaluation of Canadian corporate activity in Sudan. In 
this respect it should also be recalled that the intermediate period in apartheid-era South 
Africa was followed by widespread divestment. 
 
 
